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Abstract 
 
Social impact bonds are payment by results contracts that leverage private social 
investment to cover the up-front expenditure associated with welfare services. The 
introduction of private principles and actors through outcome-based commissioning has 
received a great deal of attention in social policy research. However, there has been 
much less attention given to the introduction of private capital and its relation to more 
established forms of quasi-marketization. This paper examines what effect private social 
investment has on outcome-based commissioning and whether the alternative forms of 
performance measurement and management that social impact bonds bring to bear on 
service operations demonstrate the capacity to engender: innovation in service delivery; 
improved social outcomes; future cost savings; and additionality. As the welfare regime 
at the vanguard of this policy development, this paper draws on an in-depth study of four 
social impact bonds in the UK context. The findings suggest that the introduction of 
private capital in outcome-based commissioning has had a number of unique and 
unintended effects on service providers, operations and outcomes. The paper concludes 
by considering whether social impact bonds represent a risk or opportunity for public 
service reform both in the UK and further afield. 
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Introduction 
 
Across advanced capitalist economies, the increased prominence of outcome-based 
commissioning is underpinned by a desire to improve service quality, mitigate risks 
associated with service experimentation and enhance the social outcomes achieved 
using public resources (OECD, 2015). Within the UK context, payment by results (PbR) 
has been drawn upon as a reform mechanism intended to ‘stimulate more openness and 
innovation in public services through new types of providers within the public sector, 
where this will improve services and give better value to the taxpayer’ (Cabinet Office, 
2011: 40). In many respects, social impact bonds (SIBs)1 can be understood as the 
latest manifestation of this policy priority and part of a broader trend towards welfare 
pluralism in the UK.  
 
SIBs are ‘a form of payment by results but extend this by harnessing social investment 
from capital markets’ to cover the up-front costs of service intervention (McHugh et al., 
2013: 247; Sinclair et al., 2014; Nicholls and Tomkinson, 2015). At present, there are a 
relatively small number of SIBs worldwide. However, as an emerging policy field, the 
number of contracts is growing and at a remarkably fast rate (Fraser et al., 2016). As the 
welfare regime at the vanguard of this policy development, this paper focuses on SIBs 
within the UK context and lessons this might garner for their future development 
internationally. 
 
In a review of the existing literature, Fraser et al. (2016: 9) observe that academic 
consideration of SIBs tends to be cautionary in terms of questioning the ‘appropriateness 
of “private sector” values and mechanisms in the field of public services’. Without doubt, 
the introduction of SIBs represents a concerted commitment to reduce the role of the 
state in welfare provision. However, characterizing these developments as a linear 
transition towards the privatization of ‘public’ services, neglects the varied motivations 
and conditions that shape the extent and character of welfare pluralism. In reality, a 
plurality of private actors, logics and features interact within and across service 
dimensions to affect the operation, impact and status of public services.  
 
Beyond a critique of its contribution towards the quasi-marketization of public services, 
the increased role of private capital in the financing of welfare provision is relatively 
underexplored and largely presumed in social policy debates (Propper and Green, 
2001). As a result, examination of the private financing of welfare services has tended to 
overlook the heterogeneous kinds of private capital present within public services and 
their dynamic influence on service operations and delivery. Whilst the introduction of 
private principles and actors through outcome-based commissioning has received a 
great deal of attention in social policy research (Considine et al., 2011; Rees, 2013; 
Carter and Whitworth, 2015), there has been much less attention given to the role of 
private capital in the financing of welfare provision and its relation to more established 
forms of quasi-marketization. 
 
To address this and the relative paucity of empirical evidence on SIBs (Ronicle et al., 
2014), this paper critically examines the role of private capital, and more specifically, 
private social investment in outcome-based commissioning and its effect on welfare 
services delivered through the SIB model. Above and beyond the putative benefits of 
                                               
1
 A range of cognate terms for SIBs are used internationally: ‘Pay for Success Schemes’ in the US, ‘Social 
Bonds’ in New Zealand, and ‘Social Benefit Bonds’ in Australia.  
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conventional outcome-based commissioning, the introduction of private social 
investment has been justified according to a number of linked policy objectives: 
innovation in service delivery (DWP, 2016: 14); improved social outcomes (Cabinet 
Office, 2014: 9; Bridges Ventures, 2016: 1); future cost savings (Cabinet Office, 2016b: 
1; Social Finance, 2016: 23); and additionality (Cabinet Office, 2011: 52; Cabinet Office, 
2016a: 16). This paper seeks to establish what bearing private capital has on welfare 
services delivered through PbR contracting and whether SIBs demonstrate the capacity 
to fulfil these policy objectives. At present, there is a tendency within policy discourse 
and the grey literature to suggest that the putative benefits accrued through the SIB 
funding model are somewhat idiosyncratic and distinct from the PbR mechanism that 
underpins it (e.g. Cabinet Office, 2010; Bridges Ventures, 2016; Cabinet Office, 2016c; 
Social Finance, 2016). With this in mind, there is a need to disambiguate the respective 
and collective significance of private social investment and outcome-based 
commissioning and their effect on welfare services.  
 
The paper starts by situating SIBs and the introduction of private capital within a broader 
policy context of outcome-based commissioning and welfare pluralism. The remainder of 
the paper examines what effect private social investment has on outcome-based 
commissioning and whether the alternative forms of performance measurement and 
management that SIBs bring to bear on service operations demonstrate the capacity to 
achieve their intended policy objectives.  
 
Social Impact Bonds and Outcome-based Commissioning  
 
There are two key features to outcome-based commissioning in public service reform. 
The first is a shift in focus away from service inputs, outputs and processes and towards 
quantifiable social outcomes that dictate the rate and amount of payment received by 
contracted service providers. Provided the appropriate incentive structures are put in 
place, this has the capacity to drive up standards of service provision and target 
resources where they are most needed and impactful. The second feature is that of risk 
transfer. By virtue of the PbR model, public sector commissioners only pay for those 
specified outcomes that are achieved through service interventions. In theory, this 
increases the accountability and value for money achieved through public services. In 
this respect, policy discourse presents PbR as a key means by which to increase the 
efficiency, effectiveness and equitability of public services (Fox and Albertson, 2011: 
356-360). 
 
These prospective benefits of outcome-based commissioning have proven appealing 
across policy domains and domestic contexts (Considine et al., 2011). In the UK, PbR 
contracting has grown significantly and is estimated to be worth at least £15 billion 
(NAO, 2015). In spite of this, the evidence base on the efficacy of outcome-based 
commissioning is far from established. In certain instances, the marketization of social 
outcomes has been found to compromise service quality and integrity due to ‘gaming’ 
and perverse incentives (Considine et al., 2011; Finn, 2011a; Rees et al., 2014). Other 
problems encountered include: high transaction costs and reduced flexibility; a tendency 
towards efficiency savings rather than improved service quality; and an excessive focus 
on ways of measuring outcomes, rather than ways of working (Boyle, 2011; Finn, 2011b; 
NAO, 2015).  
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In many respects, SIBs fall within the broad gamut of outcome-based commissioning 
(Fox and Albertson, 2011: 356). However, they possess a number of distinguishing 
features from conventional PbR schemes. The most central feature is that SIBs seek to 
leverage private social investment to cover the up-front expenditure associated with 
service interventions (McHugh et al., 2013). In doing so, social investors are supposed 
to take on some, or all, of the performance risk associated with experimental service 
interventions. In theory, such an approach intends to redistribute the financial risk of 
non-delivery not only away from public sector commissioners, but also from service 
providers. For smaller and third sector organisations the ostensible redistribution of risk 
through private social investment is supposed to grant them ‘a place at the table’ in 
outcome-based commissioning where they have previously struggled to compete and 
participate (OECD, 2015). However, in reality, the degree of risk re-allocation differs 
significantly between SIB models and to varying effects for involved parties. For 
example, service providers have been known to co-invest in SIBs and variable 
guarantees to social investors have, in certain instances, undermined the redistribution 
of financial risk in SIB contracts. In addition, the majority of SIB contracts have been 
awarded to larger third sector organisations, which suggests a lack of sufficient risk 
redistribution to allow smaller third sector organisations to participate. For the public 
sector, the substantial amount of seed funding that goes into the scoping and feasibility 
of various SIB contracts, suggests that service experimentation through SIBs is not 
without its financial or reputational risks for public sector commissioners.  
 
Capitalising on the expertise and skills of these organisations, service interventions 
funded through SIBs focus on achieving one or more social outcomes. SIBs tend to be 
targeted at populations with highly complex needs, most vulnerable to social exclusion 
and policy failure that would benefit from tailored, responsive and intensive service 
interventions (Cabinet Office, 2016b). This may involve exploratory trials in service 
provision where an intervention has not previously been available or has historically 
failed to produce desired social outcomes. Due to the preventative nature of service 
interventions, the anticipated cost-savings prospectively accrued by the public sector are 
used to fund the service as well as justify the returns paid to private social investors. As 
demonstrated later in this paper, these projected cost-savings are, at present, often 
hypothetical and poorly, if at all, evidenced through social impact measurement. 
Crucially, this brings into question the extent to which SIBs redistribute the financial risk 
of ‘failed’ service interventions away from the public sector and onto private social 
investors.  
 
Figure 1: The Typical Structure of a Social Impact Bond 
 
[insert Figure 1 here] 
 
In policy discourse, social investors are predominantly understood as those that are 
‘socially-minded’ in their investment portfolio, that is, seeking a blended social and 
economic return on their investment (Cabinet Office, 2016c). However, in reality, social 
investors vary greatly in terms of the profile of their capital contribution to SIB contracts. 
A broad spectrum of individual and organisational SIB investors may: prioritise a 
financial return on their investment over social outcomes achieved; forego a (higher rate 
of) return for the sake of social impacts pursued through service interventions; or seek a 
compromise between the two. As a result, the syndicate of social investors within any 
given SIB are likely to have different (and potentially conflicting) ‘motivations, which can 
lend itself to a layered capital structure’ (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015: 24). As such, 
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SIB capital finance might involve private social investment as it is predominantly 
conceived (along with the heterogeneity of motivations underpinning it), but may also 
include private philanthropy through (non-) recoverable grants, loans and investment 
guarantees. With this in mind, the terms ‘social investor’ and ‘social investment’ are used 
in this paper to refer to a plurality of private actors and capitals, as well as degrees and 
terms of investment that shape the character and effect of private finance in PbR 
contracts delivered through the SIB model. Equally, the term ‘private capital’, as a 
superordinate category, is used in this paper to refer to the range of non-public finance 
that interacts alongside one another with varying effects on outcome-based 
commissioning. 
 
In the UK, social investment within PbR has been presented as ‘another way in which 
greater competition has been introduced to public service reform to drive up quality and 
improve outcomes’ (Cabinet Office, 2014: 9). This is primarily based on an 
understanding that the introduction of private capital offers a number of supererogatory 
benefits to conventional forms of outcome-based commissioning. In theory, the up-front 
capital provided through a SIB opens up economic space for civil society organizations 
to explore, test and scale service innovations (Cabinet Office, 2016b). Whilst service 
providers are granted a degree of autonomy and flexibility from public sector 
commissioners, the social finance intermediary introduces new methods of performance 
measurement and management into the PbR contract to bring ‘an additional layer of 
rigor and scrutiny to’ social welfare programs (Social Finance, 2016: 16). This additional 
level of oversight and accountability introduced through ‘performance-based financing 
and public-private partnership’ is believed to mitigate against some of the 
aforementioned problems associated with conventional outcome-based commissioning 
(Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015: 2). 
 
On this basis, political and policy interest in SIBs has gathered pace internationally, but 
particularly within the UK context. The world’s first SIB was developed under New 
Labour to tackle recidivism and launched in Peterborough under the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition government in late 2010. Since then, central government has 
sought to provide civil society organisations ‘with the start-up funding and support they 
need to bid for government contracts or work towards delivering services under a 
payment by results model’ (Conservative Party, 2010: 38). Thus far, a variety of public 
funding initiatives have provided grants, support and subsidies to support the scoping, 
design and operation of SIBs so that these may be taken up more widely by central and 
local government. This includes the Social Outcomes Fund (£20 million), Commissioning 
Better Outcomes Fund (£40 million), DWP Innovation Fund (£30 million), Youth 
Engagement Fund (£16 million) and Fair Chances Fund (£15 million). In 2012, the 
Cabinet Office established the Centre for Social Impact Bonds. In 2016, the Cabinet 
Office commissioned the Government Outcomes Lab and launched the Life Chances 
Fund to grow ‘the number and scale of SIBs’ with a view to ‘generating public sector 
efficiencies by delivering better outcomes… and building a clear evidence base of what 
works’ (Cabinet Office, 2016b: 1). 
 
Despite the fanfare surrounding them, the evidence base on how and whether SIBs work 
is notably limited (Ronicle et al., 2014). With that in mind, the remainder of this paper 
seeks to establish what effect private social investment has on outcome-based 
commissioning and whether SIBs exhibit the capacity to engender: innovation in service 
delivery; improved social outcomes; future cost savings; and additionality. 
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Methods 
 
This paper presents findings from a study exploring the origins and operation of SIBs in 
the UK context. An initial survey of the SIB landscape was undertaken to establish the 
varying models and remit of those contracts that are or have been operational. Based on 
this, four SIBs were selected for detailed consideration: the Essex MST SIB, the 
Merseyside New Horizons SIB and the London Homelessness SIBs. These were 
selected as a heterogeneous purposive sample that exhibited considerable variation in 
terms of the: role of organisational and individual social investors; contract lengths and 
sizes; beneficiaries targeted; individual and multiple outcome payment metrics; position 
and presence of social finance intermediaries and special purpose vehicles; varying 
rates of return for social investors; and nature and extent of seed and grant funding 
drawn upon. Beyond this, as part of the first cohort of UK SIBs, these are some of the 
few contracts that have been in operation for a sufficient amount of time for it to be 
possible to establish their operation and effects. Each of the SIBs is briefly summarised 
below, but further details on their key features are available in Online Appendix 1. 
 
Commissioned by Essex County Council, the Essex MST SIB was established to reduce 
the number of days children spent in residential care. Action for Children was 
commissioned to deliver multi-systemic therapy to support families and children on the 
edge of residential care. The Merseyside New Horizons SIB was commissioned directly 
by the Department for Work and Pensions as part of the Innovation Fund: an open 
competition designed to tackle youth unemployment through the establishment of 10 
SIBs. A syndicate of social investors supported Career Connect to deliver a service 
helping disadvantaged young people to ‘participate and succeed in education or training 
and thereby improve their employability, reducing their longer term dependency on 
benefits’ (DWP, 2015: 5). Through funding supplied by the Department for Communities 
and Local Government, the Greater London Authority commissioned two London 
Homelessness SIBs. Delivered through services by St. Mungo’s Broadway and Thames 
Reach respectively, these SIBs were designed to improve the employment, education, 
training, housing and health outcomes of a cohort of entrenched rough sleepers.  
 
As illustrated elsewhere, the particular contractual, governance and funding 
arrangements of these SIBs greatly affect their respective design, operation and 
outcomes (Author a, 2016). Whilst variation between the different SIBs under 
consideration is acknowledged and accounted for in the analysis undertaken, this paper 
principally focuses on exploring the broader role of private capital in outcome-based 
commissioning across a heterogeneous set of SIB cases. Examination of the four SIBs 
comprised analysis of stakeholder documentation, process and impact evaluations as 
well as qualitative fieldwork with cross-sectoral stakeholders. Between 2015 and 2016, 
41 qualitative interviews were undertaken with policymakers, public sector 
commissioners from local and central government, third sector service providers, social 
finance intermediaries and entities, social investors and service users. The principle 
majority of these participants were directly involved in (or affected by) the financing, 
governance and service interventions delivered through the four SIBs considered. A 
smaller number of national-level stakeholders were also interviewed who were more 
tangentially involved but have nonetheless been instrumental in the development and 
uptake of SIBs at the national level. Beyond this, we also organised a practitioner 
seminar and a policy roundtable to facilitate an applied discussion between policy-
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relevant stakeholders and also undertook a range of informal interviews and 
correspondence. 
 
To varying degrees, all those interviewed for this study had a vested interest in the 
success of their respective SIB, or SIBs more generally. In order to moderate some of 
the inferences drawn from the data, all analysis undertaken has reflected upon how this 
might affect the responses of stakeholders. All service users interviewed for this study 
were approached through gatekeepers and were offered a £15 shopping voucher as a 
thank you for their time. All other participants were sent an email, inviting them to 
participate in the research along with an information sheet and consent form. Sound 
ethical practice and standards underpinned the research process to safeguard the 
anonymity, confidentiality and welfare of all research participants. 
 
The Role of ‘Private’ Capital in Outcome-based Commissioning  
 
This section establishes what bearing the introduction of private capital within these PbR 
contracts has on the fulfilment of four key policy objectives underpinning the 
development of UK SIBs.  
Innovation in Service Delivery? 
 
Proponents of SIBs suggest that the introduction of private social investment in PbR 
contracting has the capacity to create space for service experimentation and innovation 
because it redistributes part, or all, of the financial risk of non-delivery ‘away from 
government and small providers and onto social investors’ (Disley et al., 2011: 16; 
Cooper et al., 2013; Cabinet Office, 2016c). In theory, this makes it possible for smaller 
and civil society organisations to participate in outcome-based commissioning in a way 
that they have, thus far, struggled to (OECD, 2015).  
 
A substantial number of those interviewed felt that social investment had the capacity to 
foster experimental and innovative service interventions. Civil servants, social investors 
and social impact entities were particularly keen to suggest that the ‘small-scale and 
experimental’ nature of projects supported through SIBs was only possible because 
social investors were taking on the social risk in return for a prospective financial return: 
 
… the voluntary and community sector are often best placed to deliver the 
innovative and very localised services… and traditionally have suffered in 
perhaps not being able to take on the risk of payment by results. So this 
was a way of actually building their capability and capacity to ensuring 
that their up front costs were covered… (senior civil servant, 13) 
 
SIBs are repeatedly cited as a means by which to ‘promote innovation in social services 
and bring market forces to bear on service providers previously funded by traditional 
government grants’ (Cooper et al., 2013: 2). Some public sector and social finance 
stakeholders (including social investors and social impact investment entities) felt that 
the presence of private investment and actors capitalised on the capacity and freedom of 
third sector organisations to foster innovation in service delivery whilst:    
 
‘also bringing in a model which we think is constructed around a more 
rigorous approach towards assessing and evaluating specific sets of 
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interventions and where appropriate looking to scale those up’ (senior 
civil servant, 12) 
 
Compared to the impact measurement usually required, third sector organisations felt 
that there was a greater degree of oversight and accountability expected by private 
social investors in SIBs. In theory, the additional systems of performance measurement 
and management instigated through a SIB induce a change in how third sector 
organisations realise their social mission by focusing on social outcomes (DWP, 2014). 
However, across the four SIBs considered here, social investors had a number of 
supererogatory expectations that service providers collect information on inputs, outputs 
and processes extending well beyond pre-defined payment metrics. This was motivated 
by a desire to establish what particular features and conditions of a service intervention 
worked and to cultivate a dynamic environment for service innovation.  
 
In certain contexts, this created a substantial additional administrative burden for service 
providers. As a result, some third sector stakeholders felt that the degree of micro-
management built into the SIB was actually reducing their flexibility to autonomously 
pursue their social mission. Some felt that the resources and time that went into these 
additional forms of performance management and measurement could be better spent 
on front-line services.  
 
We underestimated the amount of management time that was required to 
run a SIB and we radically under-estimated the kind of information 
demand there would be from investors… progress reports and forecasts 
and re-forecasts… (third sector stakeholder, 16) 
 
If anything I would say less, there was less flexibility. Because the amount 
of management structures that are placed on a SIB mean that you have 
less manoeuvrability, you have to clear everything with this board to get 
permission to do anything. (third sector stakeholder, 25) 
 
At times, service providers felt pressured to secure outcomes to such an extent that they 
took measures to ‘insulate’ their front-line staff from the influence of certain social 
investors. The ‘marketization’ exerted by the influence of social investors had the 
capacity to encourage outcome-focused service provision. However, in certain 
instances, it equally ran the risk of promoting dysfunctional practices such as ‘creaming’ 
and ‘parking’ (Rees et al., 2014; Carter and Whitworth, 2015). This was particularly the 
case when individual social investors had a prominent role in assessing and managing 
the operational performance of a SIB through their involvement with a special purpose 
vehicle. Some third sector organisations buffered against these pressures:  
 
I think you’ve got to be careful you don’t contaminate your professional 
practice... I have to fend off the investors and have the financially focused 
discussion… otherwise you start to get into some quite questionable 
practices and run the risk of people starting to do things because of 
financial pressures… (third sector stakeholder, 39) 
 
In many ways, the up-front capital from social investors protected service providers from 
the financial and operational risks associated with innovation in service delivery. 
However, the extent of risk re-allocation varied significantly across the SIBs considered. 
For example, Thames Reach and St Mungo’s Broadway both ‘co-invested’ their own 
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equity into their respective SIBs, which, despite the presence of other social investors, 
may have inhibited their capacity (or perhaps willingness) to engage in more 
experimental service provision. As discussed later in this paper, this might come some 
way to explain why these two SIBs have observed such mixed performance in terms of 
the attainment of social outcomes. Despite this, the SIB funding model does, overall, 
appear to have helped overcome some of the limitations of previous PbR schemes that 
have exhibited an aversion to service experimentation, flexibility and innovation due to 
the risks associated with prospective financial losses (Finn, 2011b). This seems to 
indicate that the presence of social investment has the capacity to mitigate against some 
of the limitations that have, thus far, proven endemic to contracted-out services on a 
PbR basis. This includes reduced flexibility for service providers (Finn, 2011b) and a 
tendency towards innovations that centre on efficiency savings rather than improved 
service quality or effectiveness (Hudson et al., 2010). 
 
However, the additional oversight that private social investment brought to bear on 
service operations had a number of unintended effects. Whilst intensive, real-time 
performance measurement and management introduced a heightened degree of 
‘responsiveness’, ‘discipline’ and ‘rigour’ to contracts, it also detracted resources from 
front-line service provision and reduced the autonomy of some front-line practitioners. 
The requirement to measure social outcomes, but also record and seek approval for 
service processes in real-time, demanded a change in the way third sector organizations 
planned, revised and executed their operational strategy. In many respects, this 
leveraged specialist expertise and skills in a way that was most efficacious to target 
beneficiaries. However, at times, it appears to have equally detracted from the flexibility 
and discretion of service providers in terms of resource allocation and front-line service 
provision. As found in previous studies of PbR contracts, there was an excessive focus 
on ways of measuring outcomes, rather than ways of working and incentivizing 
innovation (Boyle, 2011; NAO, 2015). At times, the presence of private capital 
exacerbated, rather than helped to overcome this limitation of outcome-based 
commissioning.  
 
Based on the SIBs considered here, private social investment does appear to bring an 
additional layer of ‘private sector rigor and performance management’ to service 
operations (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015: 2). However, it is not clear that this facilitates 
any measure of service innovation that would not otherwise have been present through 
other funding models. If anything private social investment ran the risk of corrupting the 
integrity of outcome-based commissioning that targeted those most vulnerable to social 
exclusion by restricting the autonomy of third sector organizations.  
Improved social outcomes? 
 
The economic underpinnings of SIBs require social outcomes achieved to be better or 
greater than those secured through existing service interventions (Bridges Ventures, 
2016: 8; Social Finance, 2016). In spite of the current interest in the potential of SIBs 
there is, at present, very little systematic evidence on the attainment of improved social 
outcomes (Ronicle et al., 2014; Ronicle et al., 2016).  
 
Regarding the four SIBs under consideration, it is clear that these had wide-ranging 
positive effects on many target beneficiaries. Beyond the existing evaluations discussed 
below, qualitative fieldwork found that service users valued the tailored and intensive 
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support received and felt that this helped them come closer to achieving their personal 
goals: 
 
If it weren’t for [practitioner name], I wouldn’t be here. And that’s actually 
the truth… Everyone I knew thought that I probably wouldn’t make it until 
the end of the (school) year and I surprised myself how long I’ve lasted. 
(service user, 22) 
 
I’d say it’s helped quite a bit in terms of helping me get to where I want to 
be. I’m not there yet but I will be. If they didn’t help me I suppose I’d still 
be homeless. (service user, 30) 
 
Very often the achievement of social outcomes was attributed to the holistic service 
interventions funded as part of the SIB. A number of service users felt that the 
personalized and regular nature of support helped them overcome the challenges they 
faced:  
 
He did all the paperwork for that – if he hadn’t of done that I’d probably 
still be in the hostel now. They were constantly on the phone with me and 
I needed that - just that little bit of guidance… you know more hands on - 
just to get me in the door sort of thing. (service user, 41) 
 
Outcome-focused provision underpinned by service learning and flexibility appeared to 
produce a number of positive outcomes for target populations (DWP, 2014; OPM, 2015; 
St Mungo's Broadway, 2015; Thames Reach, 2015). However, whether this represents 
an improvement relative to previous or existing services and whether outcomes 
achieved can be attributed to the presence of the private social investment remains less 
clear.  
 
The London Homelessness SIBs positively affected the outcomes and opportunities of 
many service users through innovative and intensive service provision (St Mungo's 
Broadway, 2015; Thames Reach, 2015). Nonetheless, the available evidence suggests 
that service interventions, delivered through the Thames Reach and St Mungo’s 
Broadway SIBs, under-performed in certain areas and struggled to fulfil a number of the 
pre-defined outcome targets (DCLG, 2015). This included reducing the rate of rough 
sleeping below a modelled baseline, meeting initial and sustained repatriation targets 
and helping service users secure qualifications, volunteering and part-time work 
opportunities. In particular, the absence of a special purpose vehicle in the Thames 
Reach SIB appears to have negatively affected the degree of performance management 
in service operations with it faring worse than St Mungo’s Broadway in terms of securing 
and sustaining social outcomes. In certain areas, the performance of both SIBs 
exceeded targets for securing stable accommodation for entrenched rough sleepers and 
the sustainment of full-time employment. However, on the only modelled baseline, the 
SIBs fell short of target reductions in rough sleeping (Ronicle et al., 2014: 40-41). In light 
of this, there is no current evidence to suggest that these SIBs were able to produce 
improved social outcomes relative to previous and other existing service interventions.  
 
By contrast, available evidence suggests that the Merseyside New Horizons SIB 
significantly exceeded its initial targets on improved attendance and behaviour in school, 
as well as attainment of NVQ Level 1 (Social Finance, 2016: 29). In addition, the final 
qualitative evaluation of the DWP Innovation Fund, found that virtually all young people 
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interviewed were positive about the support services they received (DWP, 2016: 48). 
There is also some evidence to suggest that the financing model proved instrumental to 
the attainment of outcomes achieved. Many stakeholders involved in the DWP 
Innovation Fund felt that the presence of social investors and their interest in social 
outcomes being achieved lead to a very hands-on approach in ensuring services were 
performing to profile and were able to achieve ‘better results than they would have done 
had the pilot been commissioned using more traditional procurement methods’ (DWP, 
2016: 32). 
 
The latest evaluation of the Essex MST SIB suggests that outcomes achieved are 
exceeding pre-defined targets and national averages (OPM, 2015). The Essex MST is 
also proving slightly more effective than other MST services nationally. In spite of this, 
due to the context within which the SIB has been established, it is difficult to ascribe 
improvement to the presence of private social investment and it’s bearing on service 
outcomes. Firstly, the multi-systemic therapy provided through the SIB is a novel service 
offer for Essex County Council. Secondly, a substantial restructuring of the Council’s 
children’s support services occurred alongside the introduction of the SIB. As a result, 
the comparison of the SIB’s effect on social outcomes against a historical baseline 
proves highly problematic. This makes it particularly challenging to establish how the SIB 
structure impacts on the implementation of MST and whether social investment in the 
PbR mechanism adds any further value in terms of outcomes or performance. Whilst the 
required adherence to and rigidity of the MST model of intervention leaves less space to 
innovate and take risks, there are some signs to suggest that social investors are 
introducing more rigorous governance mechanisms into the PbR model. This includes 
drawing on a flexible funding pot where it is believed this will lead to improved outcomes 
and pursuing alternative strategies for personnel management. In this respect, the Essex 
SIB model exhibits the capacity to ensure the service provider adheres to targets for pre-
defined social outcomes and payment metrics (OPM, 2015).  
 
Based on the evidence available, service interventions offered through the SIB model 
demonstrate the capability to produce a range of valuable social outcomes for service 
beneficiaries. However, there is limited and at times partial evidence that the presence of 
private social investment in outcome-based commissioning is securing improved social 
outcomes. In certain instances this is simply because a service intervention has failed to 
deliver on pre-defined outcome metrics when compared against a baseline. On other 
occasions however, there is a broader problem of standards of evidence and the 
inevitable challenges associated with defining and measuring the ‘impact’ and ‘value-
added’ of SIBs relative to other forms of outcome-based commissioning. At present, the 
vast majority of SIBs worldwide employ performance and payment metrics that rely on 
the validation of administrative data, as opposed to more complex evaluation methods 
that involve a comparison of service beneficiaries to other, more comparable groups 
through counterfactuals (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015: 20).  
 
In conclusion, there are some SIBs employing effective and rigorous systems of impact 
measurement. Overall however, the validity and viability of comparative baselines tends 
to be quite poor with SIBs lacking a genuine historical or real-time baseline through 
which to measure the relative social, economic and operational value of a service 
intervention. This leads to difficulties associated with evidencing effects, relying on proxy 
indicators of social outcomes and the spurious attribution of causes and effects within 
the SIB model (McHugh et al., 2013). Taken together, these factors represent a serious 
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challenge for establishing the relative effects of an innovative service intervention 
alongside an experimental financing model. 
 
Having said that, social investors and social finance intermediaries do appear to have 
introduced heightened degrees of scrutiny and rigour into the governance of the PbR 
contracts examined here. Through real-time assessment of social outcomes and 
operations, service providers were both compelled and supported to ‘stay on track’ in 
triggering outcome payments. Whether this can, or will, lead to a relative improvement in 
social outcomes remains to be confirmed.  
Future Cost Savings? 
 
Many intensive PbR interventions are justified on the basis that subsequent public sector 
savings will be observable if social outcomes are achieved. Similarly, many of the SIB 
outcomes and payment metrics are constructed based on the prospective financial 
savings that they may eventually create for the public sector (Social Finance, 2016: 23). 
With this in mind, commissioners need payment metrics within the SIB model ‘to reflect 
the balance in savings that are generated for the wider public sector’ (Cabinet Office, 
2016b: 1). Based on the premise of preventative service provision, this funding model is 
presented as having the ‘potential to help deliver public services more efficiently and, in 
some cases, tackle the underlying causes of growing demand for services instead of just 
trying to cope with their consequences’ (Cabinet Office, 2016a: 7).  
 
Without evidenced effects confirming the relative improvement of social outcomes, the 
prospective savings achieved through a SIB are unlikely to be observed in the public 
sector. This is particularly problematic if private social investors are paid on the 
assumptions that cost savings will be made and the high transaction costs associated 
with SIB set-up and service experimentation will be covered as a result. A number of 
cross-sectoral stakeholders interviewed for this study felt that the high transaction costs 
associated with developing the SIB threatened the future cost savings achievable: 
 
If it wasn’t for certain logistical difficulties, you would probably want to do 
it directly because it adds to the costs – very high transactions costs 
(social investor, 11) 
 
Whilst those involved in the establishment and operation of SIBs tended to acknowledge 
the diverse needs and complex circumstances of service beneficiaries, there was, 
nonetheless, a tendency to assume fixity to the social outcomes achieved. Very often, 
the permanency of social outcomes secured (or thought to be secured) was presumed 
and built into the economic modelling of a SIB. The consequent payments to private 
social investors were justified on the assumption that outcomes were both sustained and 
carried through to changes in behaviour, outcomes and opportunities for target 
beneficiaries. In reality, service users are subject to a dynamic set of conditions within 
and beyond the SIB intervention. 
 
Due to the significant challenges and needs faced by some service users, the 
sustainability of particular outcomes was threatened or lost following the service 
intervention. By virtue of the outcome-based contracts underpinning the SIB model, 
services focus on achieving social outcomes, rather than the continuity of service 
outputs characteristic of conventional public sector commissioning. This, perhaps, 
comes some way to explaining why a small number of service beneficiaries wanted 
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there to be ‘more of a transition period’ and felt somewhat ‘abandoned’ once outcomes 
had been achieved:   
 
I’m surprised the way its just been ended so suddenly - it’s meant I’m not 
doing so well now. (service user, 19) 
 
I’m struggling at the moment… I’ve moved so far away from everybody. 
That hasn’t helped and its something I’ve got to sort out. I’ve relapsed 
and I’m hoping it’s not permanent. (service user, 30) 
 
This poses a number of difficult questions about the legacy of SIBs and the extent to 
which social outcomes, however improved, can reasonably be considered to have a 
permanent effect on service users. This is particularly significant because, by and large, 
SIB payment metrics are constructed based on the assumption that social outcomes 
achieved through service interventions are lasting, and can therefore be justified in light 
of the prospective cost savings they accrue to the public sector over time. Beyond this, 
the fragility with which certain social outcomes are secured and maintained points to the 
importance of service continuity and support infrastructure existing alongside SIBs 
offering more intensive, if only temporary, assistance to target populations.  
 
Additionality? 
 
SIBs are widely presented as having the capacity to ‘unlock an unprecedented flow of 
finance for social sector organizations… to tackle ingrained social problems which weigh 
heavily on our society and national purse’ (Social Finance, 2009: n.p.; Cabinet Office, 
2011; Cabinet Office, 2016a). Whilst the social outcomes achieved through SIBs are 
eventually capitalized through government payments, the private capital invested tends 
to be seen as supplementary to and distinct from the public funding landscape. In reality, 
the presence of the former is contingent on the latter. 
 
Nonetheless, a number of civil servants, social investors and social impact entities 
interviewed for this study felt that social investment was an effective means by which to 
secure additional resources that would otherwise remain inaccessible to third sector 
organisations and ‘could improve the quality and availability of public services’ (Cabinet 
Office, 2011: 41; Bridges Ventures, 2016). This was particularly the case for those 
advocating the benefits of private social investment over philanthropic donations:  
 
I feel able to back some social investments with more investment money 
than I might be able to do with gift money which I think is part of the logic 
of social investment in the first place: unlocking genuinely new money 
(social investor and director of special purpose vehicle, 23) 
 
The introduction of this ‘additional’ capital, has occurred alongside substantial cuts to 
government grants and a steady increase in government contracts for the voluntary and 
community sector since 2010 (NCVO, 2016). As a result, senior civil servants felt it 
particularly important for third sector organisations to become ‘investment-ready’ in order 
to adapt to and survive the changing funding landscape:  
 
All of the actors working in the social field have to change a little bit of 
their mind set otherwise they will simply die and no longer be able to offer 
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a service because the public budgets are scarcer and scarcer (senior civil 
servant, 13) 
 
More recently, there has been a slight upturn in funding received by ‘super-major’ 
charities (NCVO, 2016). However, smaller organisations that are less well equipped to 
bid for large-scale public sector contracts have struggled to recover funding lost since 
2010 (NCVO, 2016). Needless to say, this poses a significant challenge for the capacity 
and operations of third sector organisations. Alongside this, political and policy interest in 
social investment has grown considerably and has been presented as a new funding 
model to fill a gap in existing service provision (Disley et al., 2011; Cabinet Office, 
2016a). In spite of this, the majority of the third sector stakeholders interviewed for this 
study viewed social investment as a tool of ‘last resort’: 
 
In an ideal world we (charities and voluntary and community groups) 
wouldn’t have to resort to social investment. (third sector stakeholder, 4) 
 
Given that we live in a country where the welfare state has withdrawn 
from that level of intervention, then social investment is an effective 
alternative. (third sector stakeholder, 16) 
 
Within the context of increasing financial uncertainty for third sector service providers, 
social investment has been pitched as ‘a source of additional funding when public 
spending is constrained’ (Ronicle et al., 2014: 35). To the extent that social investment 
has, in certain instances, enabled ‘the commissioning of services that would otherwise 
not be commissioned’, SIBs can be seen as fulfilling the objective of additionality in 
terms of both resources secured and social outcomes achieved. Having said that, the 
validity of this interpretation greatly depends on the stakeholder in question and whether 
SIBs are viewed within their narrower or broader context. For public sector 
commissioners, the risk re-allocation afforded through up-front private capital can be 
seen as offering a financing model that facilitates additional service experimentation and 
innovation. However, for smaller third sector organizations, confronted with significant 
cuts to their statutory funding, private social investment represents an alternative funding 
stream to deliver contracted-out welfare services. More broadly, the marketization 
introduced through private social investment, runs the risk of undermining ‘the distinctive 
contributions that nonprofit organizations make to creating and maintaining a strong civil 
society’ through value-driven services, advocacy, voluntarism, community-focused social 
networks and civic participation (Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004: 138).  
 
Conclusion 
 
Proponents of SIBs suggest that private capital within outcome-based commissioning 
has the capacity to leverage additional resources for innovative services that will lead to 
improved social outcomes and future cost savings for the public sector. In this regard, 
the introduction of private social investment does present an opportunity to fund welfare 
services that would otherwise not be commissioned within the current climate of welfare 
withdrawal and fiscal recalibration in advanced capitalist economies. However, there is, 
at present, very little definitive evidence to suggest that services funded through such a 
mechanism lead to any relative improvement in social outcomes compared to more 
conventional PbR commissioning models. In great part, this is due to the poor availability 
and standards of evidence that are currently available, and the challenges associated 
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with accurately identifying the attainment and cause of complex social outcomes over 
time. However, where there is evidence available, it is rather mixed. With this in mind, 
SIBs present a new set of risks and opportunities in the field of public service reform. 
 
In theory, the presence of private capital in outcome-based commissioning has the 
capacity to accommodate for and buffer against the risks associated with public service 
innovation, which may, in turn, engender an improvement in the social outcomes 
achieved through public sector commissioning. The findings of this paper suggest that 
private social investment helps overcome some of the existing limitations of PbR 
contracting by, inter alia, re-distributing the financial risks of non-delivery. However, for 
the SIBs considered here, the prospective benefits of service innovation appeared to 
originate more from the novelty, size and experimental nature of the PbR contract, rather 
than the presence of private capital and the attendant functions it brought to bear on 
service operations. If anything, the presence of private social investment appeared to 
stifle the flexibility and autonomy of service providers to innovate and deliver services 
according to their social mission within a PbR contract. In addition, far from granting 
smaller third sector organisations a place at the table in outcome-based commissioning, 
SIBs have principally been awarded to larger third sector organisations deemed to be 
‘investment-ready’. 
 
Private social investment and the real-time performance measurement and management 
fostered through the SIB model did increase the responsiveness of service provision by 
encouraging, and at times, compelling service providers to perform to profile. However, 
in certain instances, this ran the risk of corrupting the integrity of the, albeit poorly 
designed, PbR contract by encouraging ‘gaming’ amongst those with a vested interest in 
the attainment of social outcomes. Overall, SIBs appear to entail a rolling back of state-
directed process regulation (through outcome-based commissioning), but a rolling 
forward of process regulation by newly introduced private actors (through social 
investment). In reality, the motivations and characteristics of these private social 
investors and social finance intermediaries are diverse and wide-ranging. As such, the 
influence they exert over service operations in terms of maximising efficiency, 
effectiveness and equitability varies significantly according to the particular configuration 
of private actors and interests served within any given SIB. Such variability, without 
oversight from public sector commissioners, is likely to exacerbate the challenges 
encountered through more conventional PbR contracting. 
 
Due to their infancy, it remains unclear whether and under what circumstances SIBs 
might be considered appropriate or suitable within the broader context of public service 
reform. As the evidence base surrounding SIBs emerges, particular attention needs to 
be paid to improving the standards and methods of social impact measurement and 
establishing the relative (dis-) benefits of private social investment in outcome-based 
commissioning. This paper comes some way to contributing towards this emerging 
evidence base, but there are inevitable limitations in trying to explore the operation and 
effects of SIBs through the perspectives of those who have a vested interest in their 
development and uptake. To moderate some of the (idealised) claims surrounding SIBs, 
further critical and independent consideration is needed to establish the relative role and 
significance of private capital in outcome-based commissioning. Without this and 
evidenced effects of improved (and sustained) social outcomes, the public sector runs 
the risk of paying increased transaction costs associated with private social investment 
without realising the putative benefits offered through the SIB model.  
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